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THE VALUE OF VALOR: 




The United States Supreme Court recently overturned the Stolen Valor 
Act on the ground that the law’s blanket prohibition on falsely claiming to 
have received a military medal or decoration violated the First Amendment 
right to free speech.  This Article uses the controversy provoked by the law 
to explore the implications of offering compensation for military service in 
the form of medals, in addition to money.  How are these two, medals and 
money, related?  Should we think of both as government issued, 
conventional forms of value?  Querying the distinctions between money 
and medals, and the ways in which the boundaries around medals are drawn 
and policed, offers a means of considering the forms of value that underlie 
compensation for the work of those who fight in the name of the nation.  In 
an era where value is increasingly assessed in monetary terms, what might 
medals tell us about the resistance of certain forms of value to such 
conversion?  Furthermore, understanding the relation between medals and 
money is of vital importance because the government’s increased use of 
private military contractors constitutes a retrenchment from a workforce 
that is paid in both forms of value – honor and money – to one that is paid 
in money alone. 
  
 
* Associate Professor of Law, SUNY-Buffalo.  This Article was presented at McGill Law 
School’s Legal Theory Workshop and at the Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale 
Law School.  I am grateful to the participants at those events and to Mark Antaki, Hugo Cyr, Mary 
Dudziak, Eugene Fidell, Owen Fiss, Paul Kahn, Paul Linden-Retek, Daniel Markovits, Kiel 
Brennan-Marquez, Sam Moyn, Jonathan Sheehan, and Amiel Melnick for their comments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The official website dedicated to the Purple Heart, a medal awarded to 
members of the armed forces wounded in action, recounts that the medal 
was originally created by General George Washington.1  Ordered by the 
Continental Congress to stop giving commissions and promotions, since the 
Congress could not afford the extra pay these entailed, Washington drew up 
orders for a Badge of Military Merit made of purple cloth.2  In 1782, he 
directed that “whenever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the 
author of it shall be permitted to wear on his facings, over his left breast, the 
 
1. Ray Raymond, The Badge of Military Merit, MIL. ORD. OF THE PURPLE HEART, 
http://www.purpleheart.org/Downloads/Raymond%20Badge%20of%20Merit.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-22, PERSONNEL-GENERAL, MILITARY 
AWARDS para. 2-8 (11 Dec. 2006) [hereinafter AR 600-8-22]. 
2. Id. 
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figure of a heart in purple cloth, or silk, edged with narrow lace or 
binding.”3 
This origin story has been recounted numerous times of late, as the 
United States Supreme Court considered, and ultimately struck down,4 the 
Stolen Valor Act of 20055 – a law that prohibited the false claim to have 
received a medal or decoration.6  Washington’s story was referenced to 
illustrate how the current medal system can be traced to the earliest days of 
the Republic.7  It was also cited because, in his orders, Washington wrote 
that those who wore one of his badges without permission should be 
punished, thus supporting the imposition of penalties upon those who, in 
our own day, “steal” valor.8 
But what is most intriguing about the story is not mentioned in the 
court proceedings: the way in which medals and money relate to one 
another as forms of compensation.9  In the story, the General gave cloth 
because he could not give money.  This may seem unrelated to the legal 
dispute, since the issue in United States v. Alvarez10 was whether a free 
speech right existed to speak falsely about having received a medal.11  Yet, 
the prohibition on false statements is embedded within a broad separation of 
honor and medals from money and market circulation.  It is a criminal 
offense to wear, purchase, sell, or barter military decorations or medals 
“without authorization,” and they cannot be given in “exchange for 
 
3. Id.; see also History of the Medal, DEPT. OF CAL. MIL. ORD. OF THE PURPLE HEART, 
http://calpurpleheart.org/History_of_the_Medal htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
4. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012). 
5. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006) (“Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in 
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed 
Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six 
months, or both.”). 
6. Id. 
7. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); Id. at 2557-58 (Alito, J., 
dissenting); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 
(2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 3645396 (“The government’s tradition of awarding military 
honors in order to recognize acts of valor in service to the Nation dates back to the Revolutionary 
War.  In 1782, General George Washington ordered the creation of several decorations 
recognizing military service and valor . . . .”). 
8. Brief for the American Legion as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, United States 
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6210435 (“None other than George 
Washington warned:  ‘Should any who are not entitled to the honors, have the insolence to assume 
the badges of them, they shall be severely punished.’” (citations omitted)). 
9. As I discuss below, some groups do discuss the medal system as a kind of “currency” unto 
itself in order to explain the harm done by “counterfeiters.”  See infra Part VI.A; see also Brief for 
the Legion of Valor of the United States & Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 4, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 
WL 6210434. 
10. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
11. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551. 
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anything of value.”12  The prohibition on speech is but part of an endeavor 
to create and protect a class of honored persons within the society at large – 
persons described by the Congressional Medal of Honor Foundation as 
“ambassadors,” bringing a message of patriotism and sacrifice to America, 
each one a “national treasure.”13  Valor and sacrifice are often construed by 
the Army (for convenience, this Article focuses on this part of the military) 
as exceeding legal duty and what money can buy.  It seems that the honor 
bestowed through the medal is not commensurable with market value – 
indeed, honor is often defined against money.  However, this Article will 
suggest the relationship between money and medals is not so clearly 
defined. 
The dispute around the Stolen Valor Act presents an opportunity to 
reflect upon the relation between market and non-market conceptions of 
“value” – a term deployed here in a capacious and flexible sense.14  Both 
medals and money are issued by the government; both are conventional 
forms of value.  Are these simply two variations on a single idea of 
currency, or are they radically opposed forms of value? 
First, this Article examines theoretical efforts to conceptualize forms of 
value other than as understood in the context of markets and money.15  
Second, it probes the Purple Heart origin story and discerns two ways in 
which recognition in non-monetary form relates to money compensation.16  
In one, medals operate as a substitute; in another, they mark an 
incommensurable, different order of value, a debt that cannot be paid.  
These two conceptions – substitution and incommensurability – generate a 
tension that is not resolved, either in Washington’s story or in our current 
configuration.  Third, the Article situates the medal system in relation to 
some of the central features of our current military order and describes how 
in the Army there seems to be a well-established social currency of medals, 
a hierarchical system of valuation and reward that – while intersecting with 
money, is independent of it.17  Fourth, in light of the legal, cultural, and 
economic separation of the military order from civilian life, this Article 
examines efforts to police and preserve the separate status of military 
honorific value in the civilian world,18 including the Stolen Valor Act, 
 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
13. Brief for the Congressional Medal of Honor Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner 3-4, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6179422. 
14. See DAVID GRAEBER, TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY OF VALUE:  THE FALSE 
COIN OF OUR DREAMS 33 (2001). 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See infra Part V. 
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which seeks to preserve “the reputation and meaning of military decorations 
and medals.”19  Finally, this Article draws upon the discussion of medals 
and money to assess the increased reliance on private military contractors.20  
The line between medals and money is deeply related to the line between 
soldier and contractor, all the more so when we deem the latter a 
“mercenary.”  While the soldier receives both forms of compensation, the 
contractor typically only receives money, and is thus excluded from most 
military awards.21  This shift seems especially worthy of consideration as 
contractor fatalities surpassed those of soldiers.22 
The main issue is how the policy of valuing valor and creating a medal 
currency intersects with the distribution of power and authority in our 
political order.  Does valuing military valor through medals empower some 
actors (those in the military, or medal wearers, and those who bestow the 
honors) over others (the civilian population)?  Alternately, might the 
hierarchy of honor be a way for civilians to claim that their debt has been 
recognized and perhaps even discharged?  Paying in medals implies that the 
money offered the soldier was not enough – that pay is never enough, and 
that what the medal signifies is an ongoing obligation.  This may be 
appropriate, but it may also be troubling.  Why not pay what is owed, now?  
The medal system constitutes a domain of value distinct from monetary 
value.  As we will discover, this distinction is a fragile achievement. 
II. NON-MARKET VALUES 
This section critically engages legal theorists Margaret Jane Radin and 
Paul Kahn, both concerned with sites of value not reducible to markets and 
money – Radin with personhood, and Kahn with sovereignty.  Finding that 
both Radin and Kahn tend toward a dichotomous framework that 
inadvertently reaffirms an opposition between market and non-market ideas 
of value, this section turns to anthropologists David Graeber and Keith Hart 
to develop a perspective from which the oppositions – between market and 
 
19. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006). 
20. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., TRANSFORMING WARTIME 
CONTRACTING:  CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 18-21 
(2011) [hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING]. 
21. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, at 53-54 tbl. 3-4.  The regulation lists which medals may be 
given to United States or foreign civilians.  Id.; see also CROMWELL GIBBONS, MILITARY 
DECORATIONS AND CAMPAIGN SERVICE BARS OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1943). 
22. Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors:  The Un-Examined Effect of 
Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, 40 J. NAT’L L. SECURITY & POL’Y 11, 13 (2012); 
T. Christian Miller, This Year, Contractor Deaths Exceed Military Ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/this-year-contractor-deaths-
exceed-military-ones-in-iraq-and-afgh-100923. 
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state, market and personhood, money and medals – can be seen as mutually 
constituting. 
A. MARKET-INALIENABILITY 
Margaret Jane Radin has explored a concept of “market-inalienability” 
by outlining what she describes as “property for personhood.”23  This is a 
form of property deeply bound together with personal identity, as contrasted 
with that which is fungible and held instrumentally.24  Using the example of 
wedding rings, Radin urges that some forms of property, based on the 
degree to which they are expressive of personhood, should receive greater 
protection than other forms of property.25  A wedding ring belongs to its 
wearer in a different way than other property might (perhaps the soldier’s 
medal bears some resemblance).  In linking property and personhood, 
Radin describes an important category of things that resist marketization.  
But the “personal” is not the only field that resists marketization, and 
money is not only an expression of market value. 
In addition to the personal property Radin describes, we can identify 
forms of non-market value that are not personal, such as sovereign territory, 
or sacred or religious property.26  There are ways in which personhood is 
developed and relates to non-market value that emerge not as an expression 
of an internal personal identity, but by looking beyond the self and finding 
value in objects precisely because they are not of the self.27  Along these 
lines, property scholars have extended Radin’s conception of personhood to 
the collective level – peoplehood – in writing, for example, about 
indigenous peoples.  Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley 
urge that “Radin’s account of personhood captures precisely the meaning 
that cultural property may carry for indigenous people:  that some 
properties are so constitutive of one’s identity that they demand treatment 
that transcends – and surpasses – that of an ordinary market transaction.”28  
This conception expands the frame on what is considered property and what 
kind of entity holds it.  But it is not only relevant to indigenous 
communities.  Indeed, in our society, sites, objects, and documents are 
 
23. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960 (1982) (“I 
shall call these theoretical opposites – property that is bound up with a person and property that is 
held purely instrumentally – personal property and fungible property respectively.”). 
24. Id. at 959-60. 
25. See id. at 959-60, 1005. 
26. As Radin has also noted.  MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 13 
(1993). 
27. For a similar critique, see Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 
WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 93, 127-28 (2011). 
28. Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1048 (2009). 
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similarly constitutive of collective identity.29  The sale of medals is 
prohibited under the same part of the United States Code where we find the 
Stolen Valor Act.  We could see medals as a kind of personal property in 
Radin’s terms, which perhaps captures how some veterans relate to their 
medals.  But medals express other kinds of non-market value as well, such 
as the public, collective, or sovereign values the medal instantiates. 
A second elaboration of Radin’s framework concerns an understanding 
of money as an object of the market.  We should recall that money as we 
know it is as much a creation of the state as the market, and in some of its 
forms it bears the sovereign’s inalienable stamp on its face.30  Keith Hart 
draws attention to this in his seminal article on money: 
Look at a coin in your pocket.  On the one side is ‘heads’ – the 
symbol of the political authority which minted the coin; on the 
other side is ‘tails’ – the precise specification of the amount the 
coin is worth as payment in exchange.  One side reminds us that 
states underwrite currencies and the money is originally a relation 
between persons in society, a token perhaps.  The other reveals the 
coin as a thing, capable of entering into definite relations with 
other things . . . .31 
Hart contrasts a “commodity” theory of money – which usually contends 
that money should be tied to specie – to various “token” theories, which see 
money as a product of the state.32  In Hart’s terms, Radin may see only one 
side of the coin – the market.  To interpret exchange for money as being 
only about the market leaves unexamined the manner in which the 
sovereign creates money, or at least one side of the coin.33  The central 
point is that the examination of different forms of value should not accept a 
simple theory of money.  The dichotomies that underpin Radin’s core 
distinction between the fungible and the personal – between objects that 
 
29. See Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Sacred Property:  Searching for Value in the Rubble of 9/11, 
in AFTER SECULAR LAW 322, 322 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011). 
30. Keith Hart, Heads or Tails?  Two Sides of the Coin, 21 MAN 637, 638 (1986); see also 
Bill Maurer, The Anthropology of Money, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 15, 27 (2006). 
31. Hart, supra note 30, at 638. 
32. Id. at 645-46 (“There are thus three types of theory opposed to the classical orthodoxy 
which regards money solely as a commodity, subject to the laws of competitive markets.  These 
are all token theories which insist that money is a symbol for something intangible, an aspect of 
human agency, not just a thing like a lump of coal.  Money as trust locates value in the morality of 
civil society; its fulcrum is the management of credit and debt in human relations. . . . Money as 
the expression of state policy emphasizes the role of law and government intervention . . . .  The 
populist theory of money stresses the accumulated institutions of a nation as a necessary 
framework for markets and finance.” (emphasis in original)). 
33. See generally id. 
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circulate and those that are kept; between the public and the private sphere 
– should be placed in broader frame. 
B. TRANSCENDENCE AND THE SACRED 
Another perspective from which to analyze non-market forms of value 
is through the lens of “political theology,” drawing on the work of Carl 
Schmitt.34  According to Schmitt, market relations operate in the shadow of 
the heterogeneity of the friend/enemy divide, not the homogeneity of 
market price and exchange.35  Supposedly, secular notions such as 
sovereignty are in fact theological in their core structure or source.36  Legal 
theorist Paul Kahn, among others, has developed this trajectory in his work 
on the political culture of the United States.37 
Kahn’s project is to discern the ways in which Americans 
simultaneously live in a liberal world of law and a sacred sovereign order.38  
In Kahn’s telling, the sovereign and the sacred dimensions of political 
order, visible in the notion of a divine king, are relocated to the popular 
sovereign as popular sovereignty emerges in revolution and is objectified in 
the Constitution.39  Where Carpenter found liberal theory problematic in the 
context of indigenous communities, Kahn, similarly, finds liberal theory – 
grounded in contract, consent, reason, and the practice and metaphor of the 
market – an incomplete lens through which to understand our political 
community and its own grounding in sacrifice and sovereignty.40  The 
experience of the sacred is paradigmatically found in sacrifice:  the act 
through which the citizen gives themself to the political project.  In 
sacrificial action, upon which the state is founded and preserved, we enter a 
relation inexplicable to the liberal order since liberalism deems individual 
life the highest value.  From Thomas Hobbes onward, Kahn contends, 
contract theory cannot explain the moment at which the citizen gives their 
 
34. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY:  FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George Schwab trans., 2005). 
35. Id. 
36. For different ways of conceiving of Schmitt’s use of religion – as analogy and homology, 
among others, see Banu Bargu, Stasiology:  Political Theology and the Figure of the Sacrificial 
Enemy, in AFTER SECULAR LAW 140, 140 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011). 
37. PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY:  FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF  
SOVEREIGNTY 38 (2011). 
38. PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 251 (2004). 
39. Id. at 257.  Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Sacrifice and Sovereignty, in STATES OF VIOLENCE:  
WAR, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND LETTING DIE (Austin Sarat & Jennifer L. Culbert, eds. 2009). 
40. Id. at 15-16, 231. 
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life for the state.41  Thus, political violence and the military take on 
particular significance for Kahn.42 
To the immanent market, political theology counterpoises the 
transcendent sovereign and state.  Whether concerned with personal 
property and inalienability, or the transcendence of sovereignty, both 
approaches can be seen as arising in opposition to, and complementary 
with, market value.  How, then, might we envision a broader picture 
composed of both market value and non-market value?  Rather than 
recapitulating the dichotomy between the foundational, transcendent or 
inalienable sites that are fixed and ground a social order – and the value 
generated through exchange, circulation, and movement – we should treat 
the dichotomy as a whole, as composed of complementary and 
interdependent senses of value.  Rather than police the boundary, as I 
understand Radin’s effort; or collapse one side into the other, as some 
economists might attempt by declining to discuss value in favor of 
individual preference or utility;43 or treat the sovereign order as distinct, as 
Kahn does, I am interested in how the opposed forms of value 
interpenetrate at times and are kept separate at others.44  In the divides 
between medals versus money, and soldier versus contractor, we have a 
provocative case study. 
 
41. Id. at 63. 
42. See generally id. 
43. Modern economics displaces normative questions of value with a focus on individual 
utility and preference.  Value becomes simply the expression of individual preference – hence it is 
a “subjective” conception of value, and the notion of value as a social, objective fact, as 
developed, for instance, in John Locke or Karl Marx’s “labor theory of value,” is left behind.  See 
CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 120-21 (1976) (“Value is thus nothing inherent in 
goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself.  It is a judgment 
economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of 
their lives and well-being.  Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men.  It is, 
therefore, also quite erroneous to call a good that has value to economizing individuals a ‘value,’ 
or for economists to speak of ‘values’ as of independent real things, and to objectify value in this 
way.  For the entities that exist objectively are always only particular things or quantities of 
things, and their value is something fundamentally different from the things themselves; it is a 
judgment made by economizing individuals about the importance their command of the things has 
for the maintenance of their lives and well-being.  Objectification of the value of goods, which is 
entirely subjective in nature, has nevertheless contributed very greatly to confusion about the basic 
principles of our science”).  For an insightful discussion and review see DANIEL HAUSMAN, 
PREFERENCE, VALUE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE 62-65 (2012). 
44. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 199 (2006).  Miller maps out a position that 
insists on the virtual unavoidability ranking, comparison and pricing (contra incommensurability 
and other objections), while also insisting on how much more nuanced and complex comparing 
and pricing actually is (contra economists who see a simple task of preference ranking).  Id. 
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C. ECONOMIC THEOLOGY 
One recent effort to develop a perspective that encompasses value 
broadly and sees transcendent political theology and everyday market value 
as mutually constitutive is found in the work of anthropologist David 
Graeber.45  In a retelling of the history of debt, he insists on the importance 
of seeing credit as historically and analytically prior to money and barter.  
He argues against Adam Smith, and much of present-day economics, in 
which the opposite story is told:  one in which a natural tendency to truck 
and barter, along with a division of labor, led to markets, and thence money, 
and finally coins stamped by the state.46  This traditional story has the 
important consequence of making money appear essentially similar to all 
the other forms of value that have come before, – albeit more convenient 
and efficient.  By contrast, Graeber’s story is one in which credit among 
persons and communities known to each other is the first way in which 
exchange was effected. 
In many small-scale societies, to the extent there is something that 
looks like money, such currencies – such as beads, shells, feathers, dog or 
whale teeth, gold, and silver – are often “never used to buy and sell 
anything at all.”47  “Instead,” Graeber writes, “they are used to create, 
maintain, and otherwise reorganize relations between people:  to arrange 
marriages, establish the paternity of children, head off feuds, console 
mourners at funerals, seek forgiveness in the case of crimes, negotiate 
treaties, acquire followers – almost anything but trade in yams, shovels, 
pigs or jewelry.”48  Hart makes a similar point in his discussion of the 
renowned kula ring of the Trobriand Islands, where ceremonial exchanges 
of personal ornaments (necklaces and bracelets) link trade partners from 
different groups and over extended periods of time.49  These objects are not 
money, where money is defined as a commodity and as medium of 
exchange.  But they are money in that they are “tokens of interpersonal 
relations, a sophisticated device for ranking political credit in an unstable 
environment of trade and war between communities.”50  These kinds of 
money Graeber and Hart call “social currencies,” and the economies they 
appear in “human economies.”51 
 
45. See DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT:  THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 71 (2011). 
46. Id. at 24-41. 
47. Id. at 130. 
48. Id. 
49. Hart, supra note 30, at 647-48. 
50. Id. at 649. 
51. GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 130; see also CHRIS HANN & KEITH HART, ECONOMIC 
ANTHROPOLOGY:  HISTORY, ETHNOGRAPHY, CRITIQUE 6 (2011). 
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Money as a portable, durable store and measure of value used in 
exchange for everyday commodities is not the organic outgrowth of local 
credit structures, or – in the economists’ version – an outgrowth of barter.  
Summarizing a broad sweep of Eurasian history, Graeber argues that 
money, states, markets, and armies emerged together.52  Where social 
currencies had local value embedded in credit relations, it was soldiers, 
persons who traveled outside local credit structures, who created a need for 
payment in a portable form.53  To pay them, states collected taxes, which 
inadvertently engendered markets where subjects would exchange 
commodities for money, which was whatever the state would accept as 
taxes.54 
Intriguingly, Graeber urges that: 
Money almost always arises first from objects that are used 
primarily as adornment of the person. . . .  There are exceptions 
(cattle, for instance), but as a general rule, it’s only when 
governments, and then markets, enter the picture that we begin to 
see currencies like barley, cheese, tobacco and salt.55 
These two stories – the depiction of social currency as arising through 
adornment, and the emergence of decontextualized money as a product of 
war and state formation – nicely confound our current contrast between 
money and medals and provoke a number of questions.  Are decorated 
soldiers or veterans wearing money in this sense – as social currency?  Does 
this suppose that the military is a “human economy?” 
Medals, as discussed in more detail later, are concerned with arranging 
relations among people.  The military does not purport to be concerned with 
money accumulation as such.  Yet the notion of a correspondence between 
the anthropologist’s small-scale, non-capitalist community and our military 
is perverse, or at least too decontextualized.  The latter is embedded in and 
advances the interests of the preeminent capitalist state, one which – 
through the military and other institutions, especially in the post-war and 
post-Bretton Woods era – has created and maintained, thus far, a global 
order of value through its money.  Thus, adapting Graeber’s stories, soldiers 
may be wearing primitive money, even while deeply embedded in 
sustaining money as an abstract, global form of value. 
In sum, Radin takes an important step in mapping personal property as 
distinct from the market; Kahn elaborates the continuing role of the 
 
52. GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 226. 
53. Id. at 213. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 145. 
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transcendent and the sacred in grounding a market order; Graeber and Hart 
urge that we consider the ways in which markets and states mutually 
constitute one another.  Each of these assists in an interpretation of the 
medal system we find in the military.  Probing the fragmentary story of the 
Purple Heart helps lay out some of the terrain. 
III. WEARING MONEY:  THE VALUE OF MILITARY MEDALS 
The Purple Heart website describes Washington’s invention as a 
response to the lack of funds from Congress:  “[d]eprived of his usual 
means of reward [promotion and pay increases], he must have searched for 
a substitute.”56  This suggests a relation between money and ribbon as that 
of a stand-in or a surrogate.  But this is an unstable relationship, especially 
if we wish to find a common point of valuation.  We might compare – as 
did Adam Smith – the lost wages to the value we might assign to the 
enhanced social standing granted by being honored.57  From this 
perspective, we might worry that the honor seems like a trick or a “bad” 
deal:  calling a loss a sacrifice or awarding a medal may simply serve to 
avoid giving soldiers more money.58  Washington’s story of honoring with 
ribbon seems to speak directly to an effort to buy peace and to pay a debt in 
another currency.  In this reading of the Purple Heart story, the cloth comes 
in lieu of “real” compensation.59  What looked like substitution, perhaps, 
turns into larceny.60 
This conception is rendered more complex when we ask what the 
difference is between money compensation and ribbons.  Famously, the 
paper money issued by the Continental Congress had itself radically 
depreciated in value by the time of Washington’s order.61  Thus, rather than 
a clear distinction between paper money and symbolic ribbon, both are 
symbolic forms issued by government, and both can be seen as substitutes 
 
56. DEPT. OF CAL. MIL. ORD., supra note 3. 
57. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 106 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1993) (1776). 
58. Id. (“What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough.  Without regarding the danger, 
however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the beginning of a new war; and though 
they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a 
thousand occasions of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur.  These romantick [sic] 
hopes make the whole price of their blood.  Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and 
in actual service their fatigues are much greater.”). 
59. Raymond, supra note 1. 
60. See Carol Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving and Trusting:  How Gifts Become Exchanges, 
and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 315-17 (1992). 
61. JERRY W. MARKHAM, 1 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  FROM 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900), at 68 (2002). 
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for “real” value as measured in specie or a commodity.62  If we want to ask 
whether the cloth used as adornment could have some money-like value, we 
should ask the inverse question of whether money could have some non-
monetary value.  In fact, radically devalued paper money was used by 
soldiers on the body in lieu of cloth – as bandages to treat wounds and as 
clothing.63  Unlike Graeber’s primitive money, which was worn because it 
was valuable, wearing Continentals was a sign of just how worthless they 
had become.  Glimmers of this insecurity around the value of money have 
recently made a comeback in the wake of the financial crisis – due in part to 
the substantial creation of money the government has engaged in.64  This 
has reminded many that our money is “fiat” money, and is not, since Nixon, 
tied to specie.65  Nonetheless, fiat money has remained valuable and 
relatively stable thus far, and we do not see soldiers and contractors wearing 
it as clothing or using it as bandages. 
Seeing the medal or cloth as a trick or bad deal is a cynical 
interpretation, and possibly offensive because it fails to see the medal as a 
symbol of transcendent loss and heroic action.  Even if, in economistic 
mode, we determine that the medal is a “good” deal in terms of the value of 
enhanced social standing, this might seem an improper analysis to 
undertake in that it seeks to find a single point of evaluation.  For those 
committed to the notion that there is a divide between market and honor, 
such a homogenizing analysis treats money as commensurable with the 
other ideas of value at play – love for comrades or nation, for instance. 
This raises an alternative conception of the relation between money and 
medals, one opposed to the substitution notion.  Drawing on Radin, we 
might call this conception one of incommensurability, that medals are not a 
 
62. Id.  Soldiers were also paid in certificates of indebtedness, “indents,” “when there were 
no funds to pay them.”  Id. 
63. Id. at 68 (“A barbershop in Philadelphia papered its walls with Continental notes”); see 
also JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK:  THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 
72 (2003) (“An old soldier, wounded in the leg, used a bundle of his pay as a bandage, and coined 
the word ‘shinplaster,’ which was later used to describe any sort of money that could not be 
redeemed.  A ship’s crew discharged in Boston, and paid off in now worthless currency, found a 
way of making suits out of the paper bills and paraded through the streets.  ‘For two or three years 
we constantly saw and were informed of creditors running away from their debtors, and the 
debtors pursuing them in triumph, and paying them without mercy,’ wrote [a contemporary 
observer].”). 
64. Ralph Benko, Fiat Money:  The Root Cause of Our Financial Disaster, FORBES (Aug. 
15, 2012), http://www forbes.com/sites/ralphbenko/2011/08/15/fiat-money-the-root-cause-of-our-
financial-disaster/.  
65. See Maurer, supra note 30, at 18; JERRY W. MARKHAM, 3 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES:  FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001), at 
38 (2002). 
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payment, and that they could never be a substitute for money.66  But note 
that the category of personal property does not seem adequate to describe 
this context, even though it is one that is opposed to market valuation. 
The awarding of the medal or ribbon is oftentimes not described as a 
giving or transfer, but rather as an acknowledgement of that which cannot 
be compensated.67  The fact that the item given often has little cash value is 
not a defect, but rather helps to signal that we are in a different domain of 
value.68  The individual is linked to a larger collectivity by the very fact that 
they have not received fair compensation.  It is just this “debt” or imbalance 
which links the individual to the larger entity, turning an exchange relation 
into a relation of incorporation.  As Graeber writes of primitive money, it 
“was not originally a way to pay debts of any sort.  It’s a way of 
recognizing the existence of debts that cannot possibly be paid.”69  The 
medals are not beyond market value simply because they are within Radin’s 
“personal” domain; rather, the medal helps mark the transformation of the 
recipient from an ordinary person into something exceeding their private 
self.70  The Medal of Honor Foundation articulates this conception nicely, 
calling medal recipients a “national treasure.”71  But when the imbalance in 
payment is not understood as an incorporation into a larger whole, it is 
easily construed as larceny.  Indeed, the larceny interpretation cannot be 
excluded, at least as a latent possibility, because it is a precondition of the 
incorporation interpretation. 
 
66. See generally Radin, supra note 23.  Radin does not use the term “incommensurable” in 
her Property and Personhood article. I use the term to refer to the claim that there are different 
kinds of value that are not comparable.  Thus, for example, I depict the sense that medals are 
given to recognize action that cannot be purchased with money as expressing a sense that medals 
and money are “incommensurable.”  I do not mean that, in fact or in some analytic sense, they 
cannot be compared and ranked.  In the abstract, it seems equally correct to say that everything 
can be compared; or that nothing can be compared.  Culture, we might say, is the scheme through 
which a given community navigates between those two logically possible but sociologically 
impossible positions.  William Miller notes the conceptual confusions that abound in this context.  
MILLER, supra note 44, at 237 (“Often, what precisely is meant by values and by 
incommensurability varies from author to author.  Some take incommensurability to mean strictly 
requiring a single scalar metric such as dollars; others argue that the issue is not scalar metrics but 
whether rational comparisons can be made.  Comparisons require only that we be able to declare 
something greater than, equal to, or less than another thing with respect to some value in some 
context.  Other confusions:  some seem to be arguing against the marketability of certain things, 
like love, babies, art; others are simply against ranking things hierarchically in some kind of 
esteem regime.”). 
67. See, e.g., Brief for Medal of Honor Foundation, supra note 13, at 4. 
68. See, e.g., Brief for American Legion, supra note 8, at 3 (citing LT. B.G. BURKETT, 
STOLEN VALOR:  HOW THE VIETNAM GENERATION WAS ROBBED OF ITS HEROES AND HISTORY 
(1998)) (“And one of the only things they get is decorations - 62 cents of material, but they’re the 
esteem of the nation bestowed upon you.”). 
69. GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 131. 
70. See generally Radin, supra note 23. 
71. Brief for Medal of Honor Foundation, supra note 13, at 3. 
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Evoking Schmitt and Kahn, we might say that medals are not just 
separate from money value, but in fact, the value of the medal grounds the 
value of money.72  The recipient of the medal has, in the extreme case, 
preserved the life of the polity and given their own life in so doing.73  The 
effect of giving oneself for the political project of the nation, and the ways 
this transforms loss into something else, into sacrifice, is evidenced most 
starkly in Lincoln’s words at Gettysburg, where individual death leads to a 
“new birth.”74 
Washington’s medals were to be available to enlisted men, an 
appropriate republican innovation, the Purple Heart website recounts, since 
in Europe medals were for aristocrats.75  In practice, however, there were 
very few of Washington’s awards created, and they do not appear to have 
become an established social currency embedded in a military or broader 
social community.76  The United States did not begin to create our current 
system of medals until the early twentieth century77 – when the country was 
far removed from an amateur militia or ideologies of Jeffersonian 
democracy, and was, rather, on the path to overseas imperial prominence, 
industrial warfare, and a permanent standing army.78  Since the actual 
relation between money and medals will always be historically specific and 
institutionally grounded, we must attempt to sketch out the relevant context 
for our era. 
 
72. See generally KAHN, supra note 38; SCHMITT, supra note 34. 
73. This view is espoused in the American Legion’s brief to the Supreme Court, where it 
quotes from Lt. B.G. Burkett’s book on stolen valor:  “The Constitution does not guarantee 
freedom; that’s a piece of paper.  The only thing that guarantees your rights is the willingness of 
citizens to stand up against our enemies.”  Brief for the American Legion, supra note 8, at 3 
(citing LT. B.G. BURKETT, STOLEN VALOR:  HOW THE VIETNAM GENERATION WAS ROBBED OF 
ITS HEROES AND HISTORY (1998)). 
74. Abraham Lincoln, “Gettysburg Address” (Nov. 19, 1863), available at Yale Law School, 
The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
19th_century/gettyb.asp. 
75. Raymond, supra note 1. 
76. DAVID F. BURRELLI & FENWICK GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42704, THE 
PURPLE HEART:  BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2012) (“Records are incomplete 
and researchers debate how many soldiers received this award, but at least three sergeants from 
Connecticut are known to have received the award after the American Revolution.  However, the 
Badge of Military Merit fell into disuse shortly after its conception.”). 
77. Brent A. Clemmer, Challenges for this Kind of War:  Modifying Army Awards for a New 
Century of Conflict, AY 2011 SCH. OF ADVANCED STUD. 3 (2011) (“The Army organized these 
tools into a system that was developed and refined over time during the United States’ 
involvement in World War I and World War II.  New awards were created since World War II, 
yet the basic structure into which they fit remains unchanged.”). 
78. Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14, 31, 34-35 
(2002) (discussing the rise of military as a distinct society after Civil War). 
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IV. THE MEDAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 
It is commonly observed that the United States military is a world apart 
from the civilian order in many respects, including socially, legally, and 
economically.79  The Department of Defense is the largest employer in the 
world,80 although the Chinese Army and Wal-Mart are not far behind.81  
We have a permanent, standing army.  It is not, as was largely the case 
through World War II, a force created for specific conflicts (although there 
have been seemingly unceasing “small” wars).82  Since the end of 
conscription in the early 1970s under President Nixon, with the support of 
economist Milton Friedman,83 the military has been a volunteer force.  
Finally, it increasingly utilizes a large number of private contractors, drawn 
from many nations.84  These features of size, permanence, volunteerism, 
and internationalized outsourcing are the relevant context within which to 
understand the relation between medals and money. 
The military order is simultaneously concerned with everyday matters 
of production, consumption, and destruction, while also encased in a rich 
iconography and practice that speaks to notions of transcendence, sacrifice, 
and a non-material world of valor and honor.  The Army Field Manual 
(Field Manual) tells soldiers that the Army is “drawn together by shared 
values and experiences, sacrifice, and selfless service to the Nation.  All 
subordinate their own welfare to a higher calling.”85  The mere labor of the 
 
79. Jon Michaels, Beyond Accountability:  The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic 
Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1086 (2004). 
80. About the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/ 
about/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (“With over 1.4 million men and women on active duty, and 
718,000 civilian personnel, we are the nation’s largest employer.  Another 1.1 million serve in the 
National Guard and Reserve forces.  More than 2 million military retirees and their family 
members receive benefits.”). 
81. Daily Mail Reporter, Defense Department, McDonalds and WalMart Top 
Employers…But China is a Close Second, MAIL ONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
article-2038401/Defence-Department-McDonalds-Walmart-worlds-biggest-employers-list html 
(last updated Sept. 17, 2011). 
82. See generally MARY DUDZIAK, WAR TIME:  AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 
(2012); MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE:  SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN 
POWER (2003). 
83. Brian Doherty, Best of Both Worlds:  Milton Friedman Reminisces About His Career as 
an Economist and His Lifetime “Avocation” as a Spokesman for Freedom, REASON ONLINE (June 
1995), http://www reason.com/news/show/29691 html. 
84. Katherine E. McCoy, Beyond Civil-Military Relations:  Reflections on Civilian Control 
of a Private, Multinational Workforce, 36 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 671, 676 (2010) (“In fact, 
despite the fact that most PMCs are based in the United States or United Kingdom, approximately 
90 percent of the PMC workforce comes from other countries.  Depending on the site, between 60 
percent and 65 percent of the workforce is composed of locals (called ‘host-country nationals,’ or 
HCNs), with the remaining 25 to 30 percent being foreigners from neither the sending nor the 
receiving countries . . . .”). 
85. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1, THE ARMY para. 2.41 (14 June 2005) 
[hereinafter FM 1]. 
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soldier is described as something of a sacrament.  While money 
compensation is offered to its members – along with many other benefits – 
the central narrative of the military is that it is a selfless servant of the 
American people and the Constitution.  The Field Manual tells soldiers how 
General Washington defused an officers’ revolt that sought to force 
Congress to pay their wages.86  It cites this as a foundational example of 
military self-subordination and service, showing “Washington’s selfless 
leadership and willing subordination [that] instituted the tradition of civilian 
control of the military – a fundamental tenet of the American military 
profession.”87  While the armed forces, in some crude measure of power, 
surely seem able to overpower the civilian order – this submission and 
sacrifice promises to foreswear such a possibility.88 
Despite the ascension of market-oriented thinking, as evidenced by 
privatization, even though soldiers are now volunteers, our law and policy 
does not conceive of the soldier as simply another market actor. Economist 
Milton Friedman described his role in the abolition of conscription as his 
“most important achievement.”89  And yet in some respects the victory of 
the market perspective has not been complete.  Even though the benefits of 
military service to the individual (including health care and education) are 
openly acknowledged, “sacrifice” and valor remain central to American 
conceptions of military service.  Indeed, some argue that the advent of the 
all-volunteer force has brought with it a separation from the military and an 
increased but shallow societal reverence.90  In public rhetoric at least, the 
soldier is certainly not described as “mercenary,” as Friedman suggested we 
all are, all the time.91  And the medal system is one important part of the 
 
86. Id. para. 1-14. 
87. Id. 
88. See Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract:  Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the 
Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1308 (1991). 
89. Doherty, supra note 83. 
90. ANDREW BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM:  HOW AMERICANS ARE 
SEDUCED BY WAR 28-29 (2005). 
91. Long after his participation on the Gates Commission, which paved the way for the end 
of conscription, Friedman recalled a memorable interchange during the Commission’s hearings 
with General Westmoreland: 
In the course of his testimony [against an all volunteer force], he made the statement 
that he did not want to command an army of mercenaries.  I stopped him and said, 
“General, would you rather command an army of slaves?”  He drew himself up and 
said, “I don’t like to hear our patriotic draftees referred to as slaves.”  I replied, “I 
don’t like to hear our patriotic volunteers referred to as mercenaries.”  But I went on to 
say, “If they are mercenaries, then I, sir, am a mercenary professor, and you, sir, are a 
mercenary general; we are served by mercenary physicians, we use a mercenary 
lawyer, and we get our meat from a mercenary butcher.”  That was the last that we 
heard from the general about mercenaries. 
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public conception of the soldier as operating in a domain of value distinct 
from the market order. 
A. THE BUREAUSTOCRACY 
Valor:  Heroism performed under combat conditions. 
Heroism:  Extreme courage demonstrated in attaining a 
noble end. 
–ARMY REGULATION 600-8-22, MILITARY AWARDS 
 
Over 210 pages, Army Regulation 600-8-22, Personnel-General, 
Military Awards, lays out in baroque detail the Army’s scheme for 
awarding medals.92  As compared with Washington’s short order, it is hard 
to read the current regulation without seeing the articulation of a 
comprehensive and effective social currency.  It is a currency occasionally 
linked to money, as when an award also brings with it a pay or pension 
increase.  But it also seems to be a free-standing order of value in a 
thoroughly hierarchical order of distinctions in which the individual can 
wear a record of their achievements on their person.  The document 
conjures what we might call – drawing inspiration from Max Weber’s ideal 
types of authority93 – a bureaucratic-aristocratic world, a bureaustocracy, 
with numerous and precise heraldic distinctions and complex processes.  It 
is a remarkable effort to capture and recognize the spontaneous, surplus act 
of valor.  Amidst the dense hierarchy, many of the awards seem to preserve 
a notion of the meaningfulness of individual action. 
The award system is one of the three kinds of compensation offered by 
the Army, including salary paid in money, promotion to higher rank, and 
awards (this is not to mention the many benefits offered to veterans).94  It is 
important to underscore that the modern military is a “not-for-profit” entity 
and its soldiers are paid a set wage.95  There are no longer bounties or prizes 
through which individual soldiers or the military as a whole share directly 
in the spoils of war (although pay can be withheld as a punishment).96  The 
 
David Henderson, The Role of Economists in Ending the Draft, 2 ECON. J. WATCH 2, 370 (2005) 
(quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, TWO LUCKY PEOPLE 380 (1998)). 
92. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1. 
93. MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 668 (1978). 
94. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 10. 
95. With respect to the Navy, see Nicholas Parillo, The De-privatization of American 
Warfare:  How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in 
the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 14 (2007). 
96. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 857 (2006); Bell v. United States, 366 
U.S. 393, 401 (1961) (“Preliminarily, it is to be observed that common-law rules governing 
private contracts have no place in the area of military pay.  A soldier’s entitlement to pay is 
dependent upon statutory right. . . .  If a soldier’s conduct falls below a specified level he is 
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Army explains that the “goal of the total Army awards program” is “to 
foster mission accomplishment by recognizing excellence of both military 
and civilian members of the force and motivating them to high levels of 
performance and service.”97  Pay in money is tied to rank and length of 
service and is not directly tied to performance.  The medals are not to be 
promised in advance as a precondition of receiving a particular goal; they 
“will not be used as prizes in contests,”98 and they are not “gifts.”99  Awards 
purport to simultaneously “recognize” and “motivate”100 and they are not to 
be given in “exchange.”101  These medals are awards, not rewards.  As a 
system of signs, different pieces of metal and cloth arranged in the proper 
order, the medal communicates precise information about where the wearer 
has served (service medals for particular campaigns), training and skills 
(badges), and notable individual conduct (decorations and medals).102  It is, 
as Brent Clemmer writes, a curriculum vitae worn on the uniform, legible to 
those who know the system.103 
The current elaborate, systematic, and hierarchical system of medals 
and honors dates back to World War I.104  Despite the intimation that 
General Washington is a direct ancestor, then, the emergence of the current 
medal system is of a more recent vintage.  In 1917, a congressionally 
established committee clarified and raised the standards for the Medal of 
Honor, which at that time was the only award for valor.105  Almost one 
thousand of these medals were revoked in cases where the action performed 
was not up to the new standard; wearing a revoked medal was deemed a 
 
subject to discipline, and his punishment may include the forfeiture of future but not of accrued 
pay.”). 
97. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, para 1-1.  This regulation defines a medal as:  “[a] term used 
to includes [sic] the three categories of awards, namely:  decorations, Good Conduct Medal, and 
service medals.  [It] also refers to the distinctive physical device made of metal and ribbon, which 
constitutes the tangible evidence of an award.”  Id. Sec. II, at 185. 
98. Id. at para. 3-1(e) (“No preconditions for an award may be established such as, for 
example, when Soldiers are informed in advance that attainment of specific goals will result in the 
automatic award of a given decoration.  Military decorations will not be used as prizes in 
contests.”). 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006); see also Kathryn R. Sommerkamp, Commanders’ Coins:  
Worth Their Weight in Gold?, 1 ARMY LAW. 6, 14 (1997). 
100. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, at para. 1-1. 
101. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a). 
102. AR 600-8-22,  supra note 1. 
103. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 2 (“Much as a professor has a Curriculum Vitae and a job 
applicant a resume on paper, a soldier wears the symbols of success on the uniform.  Although the 
meanings of the multicolored ribbons on a uniform may mean nothing to the visitor, to those who 
wear the uniform, there is deep significance, tracing a heritage back to the founding of the United 
States, and even further to the Legions of old.”). 
104. Id. at 19-20. 
105. Id. at 17 (citing JOHN E. STRANDBERG AND ROGER J. BENDER, THE CALL OF DUTY:  
MILITARY AWARDS AND DECORATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (1994)). 
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misdemeanor.106  When the Medal of Honor was rendered more rare, 
additional, and lesser, awards were created.107  In 1918, Congress 
elaborated a graduated system, one that recognized degrees of valor in a 
“Pyramid of Honor.”108  In the Pyramid of Honor, each decoration – the 
Distinguished Service Cross, the Bronze Star Medal, the Purple Heart, and 
many others – is hierarchically defined in relation to one another.109  By the 
end of World War II, the current system of medals was largely in place.110 
There continue to be changes in the medal system, especially regarding 
who and what kind of conduct is recognized.  For instance, after General 
MacArthur reintroduced the Purple Heart in 1932, its eligibility 
requirements were changed by President Kennedy in the 1960s to include 
civilians so that “advisors” in Vietnam could be recognized.  President 
Reagan again changed the criteria to include government employees killed 
by terrorist attacks and soldiers undertaking peacekeeping operations (so as 
to include the Marines killed in Beirut in 1983).  In 1997, President Clinton 
redefined the award yet again so that only military personnel were 
eligible.111  Current controversies include whether post-traumatic stress 
disorder should be recognized as a qualifying injury112 and whether soldiers 
murdered in the United States by civilians or by a fellow soldier should be 
eligible (for instance, the killing of 13 soldiers in Fort Hood by a fellow 
soldier is currently considered “workplace violence,” not an act by the 
enemy, as required for the Purple Heart).113  More broadly, Clemmer argues 
that the awards system is out of date because it remains fixated on the state-
centered conflicts around which the system was developed (i.e., World War 
I and World War II).  It fails to award “non-kinetic” activity, such as 
“courageous restraint” at the heart of contemporary conflicts and 
counterinsurgency doctrine.114 
 
106. Act of June 3, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-85, § 122, 39 Stat. 166, 214; see also Clemmer, 
supra note 77, at 18-19; UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY OF WAR 211 (1922). 
107. Michael J. Davidson, Bits of Ribbon and Stolen Valor, FED. LAW, (Sept. 2011), at 21. 
108. Act of July 9, 1918, ch. 143, 40 Stat. 845, 870-73. 
109. Id. 
110. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 29. 
111. BURRELLI & GILROY, supra note 76, at 2-3 (citing General Douglas MacArthur, War 
Department, General Orders No. 3, Feb. 22, 1932). 
112. Id. at 8. 
113. Id. at 5. 
114. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 42-43, 29 (“The World Wars continue to influence the 
Army’s corporate identity and form the frame of reference for awards, while new 
counterinsurgency theory and doctrine demand a different set of rewards.  The design of the 
pyramid of honor and the extent to which it has remained unchanged is one indication of how 
entrenched this corporate identity is.”). 
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This system – robust, complex, and requiring significant effort to 
administer – establishes a world rather like Graeber’s primitive money, one 
in which money is not used for exchange but rather serves to organize 
relations among people.  A person’s standing, history, and actions are made 
visible on the body.  The medals intersect with normal money in that they 
may lead to higher pay and promotion, and yet they are not by the military’s 
own terms a derivative system. 
The medals also have two sides, as Hart said of money.  On the one 
hand, they are creations of the state and its formal power to create value.  
But they are also understood to recognize a value not created by the state.  
This other side, however, is not the same as Hart’s market value.  Rather, 
the most prominent awards envision and invoke a kind of action that comes 
as if from nowhere – the individual heroic act.  They evoke that which 
cannot be bought, as in the requirement for the Medal of Honor, going 
“above and beyond the call of duty.”115  Thus, while the other side of the 
coin, for Hart, points to the market; the other side of the medal points to the 
excess and surplus act, even to sacrifice.  Indeed, medals seem better 
thought of as anti-money, because they mark the divide between the 
military order and commercial exchange. 
It is not sufficient to simply note the opposition between medals and 
money, or assert that medals bear some resemblance to social currency.  
Even if difficult to define in a precise manner, there is an interdependence 
of medals and money.  For the broad reach of our money as a global form 
of value depends in part upon the military’s global presence which, at least 
according to the military, relies in some part on its medal system for its 
“mission accomplishment.”116  Put simply, the global reach of value in the 
form of money should be seen as bound to the social currency we find in 
the military’s medal system. 
B. GIVING ONESELF:  THE ENLISTMENT CONTRACT 
We must also locate the medal system in the context of the enlistee’s 
relation to the military.  The Department of Defense’s four-page standard 
enlistment form contract, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, Armed 
Forces of the United States, DD Form 4/1, provides “[m]y enlistment is 
 
115. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, at para. 3-7.  In the regulation’s index “above and beyond 
the call of duty” is further described:  “Exercise of a voluntary course of action the omission of 
which would not justly subject the individual to censure for failure in the performance of 
duty . . . ”. . . . ”  Id. Sec. II, at 183.  The Medal of Honor is “presented by the President in the 
name of the Congress . . . .”  Id. at para. 3-7(b).  Others are presented within the military and do 
not go through civilian channels.  For descriptions of individual medals see id. at para. 3-17 to 3-
18. 
116. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, para. 1-1. 
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more than an employment contract.”117  It is what courts used to call a 
status contract – like marriage or naturalization – one that changes the legal 
status of the party.118  Yet it is has an additional feature, because the terms 
are subject to unilateral modification.119  The enlistee agrees to boilerplate 
language providing that: 
[M]any laws, regulations, and military customs will govern my 
conduct and require me to do things that civilians do not have to 
do.  The following statements [of law and policy] are not 
guarantees of any kind.  They explain some of the present laws 
affecting the armed forces but which Congress can change at any 
time.120 
It is an improbable “contract,” by the lights of current contract 
doctrine, since one party can change the terms as it sees fit “regardless” of 
the agreement.121  It also entails what we would describe in the civilian 
setting as the specific performance of a services contract – usually thought 
to be an impossibility.122  Additionally, the soldier cannot send or pay for a 
substitute (as could be done in the Civil War).123  This contract requires a 
giving of the self, an incorporation, more than a bilateral agreement.  
Indeed, it is something “more” than an employment contract, and this 
excess is expressed in various ritual forms such as oath-taking. 
Where Radin drew our attention to the link between personhood and 
inalienability as a way to understand non-market value, we see something 
rather different at work in this setting.124  Carpenter and her colleagues, in 
their effort to extend Radin’s notion of personhood to the collective level, 
write that what is problematic for indigenous cultural property claims is that 
 
117. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, DD Form 4/1 ¶ C.9(a) (Aug. 
1998) [hereinafter Form DD 4/1]. 
118. Interestingly, courts now seem inclined to claim that this contract is like any other 
contract.  Compare Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279-80 (D.D.C. 2005) with In re 
Grimely, 137 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1890).  The latter used the status contract notion, and, as noted in 
Qualls, describes enlistment contracts as “special because they bring about a change in status, 
from civilian to soldier, just like marriage contracts change a man’s status to husband and the 
woman’s status to wife.”  Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 152. 
119. Form DD 4/1, supra note 117, ¶ C.9. 
120. Id. ¶ C.9. 
121. Id. ¶ C.9(b) (in capital letters in original). 
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1979); see also Anthony Kronman, 
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 372-73 (1978); see also, Udi Sagi, Specific 
Performance of Enlistment Contracts, 205 MIL. L. REV. 150, 151 (2010) (noting that under a 
straight forward application of contract doctrine, that “by entering into an enlistment contract, the 
individual takes upon himself the obligations of a personal services contract, which cannot be 
specifically enforced under normal contract principles”). 
123. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70 Stat. 19. 
124. See generally Radin, supra note 23.  
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“the classic view of property law, including its ownership model, is 
intimately tied to a paradigm of liberal individualism.”125  In the enlistment 
context, we have a powerful example of how liberal individualism, 
fundamentally organized around the notion of inalienable self-ownership, 
does not capture important parts of our legal order.  The mere enlisting of 
the individual soldier is itself a sacrifice of his or her prior self.126  The 
enlistee is transformed, but this happens through an act of self, alienation, 
namely the giving and pledging of the self through the oath.  The enlistee is 
degraded in being stripped of a prior legal status as civilian but is also 
elevated in a new status as a “member,” as the contract says, of a powerful 
entity.127  The enlistee bears the marks of public power materialized in the 
uniform.128 
It is from within this context of giving of the self and the oath that we 
should locate the medal system.  Despite the transformation through the 
oath, the medal system suggests another notion – that the soldier has not 
given everything.  There is still some surplus that is impossible to extract or 
alienate merely by an order or oath.  This surplus is valor, sacrifice, and 
heroism.  The transactional form is quite nuanced because the enlistee gives 
“more” than the traditional employee, and yet something remains outside 
the relation, the giving of which the medal system recognizes. 
V. EXPORTING MEDALS TO THE CIVILIAN WORLD AND THE 
STOLEN VALOR ACT 
The previous section suggested that medals may be seen as a social 
currency, a “primitive” form of money often worn as adornment.  But the 
difference between social currencies and medals is especially apparent 
when we leave the military context and examine how medals operate more 
generally in society.  We find many individuals making false claims to have 
received a medal – claims that, because medals do not emerge from locally 
monitored credit structures, are able to pass without challenge.  First, this 
section describes some of the ways that medals are used in civilian society, 
and how Congress has sought to regulate false claims.129  Second, this 
section describes the efforts to explain the medal system to the courts in the 
context of the challenge to the Stolen Valor Act.130  While medals are 
 
125. Carpenter et al., supra note 28, at 1028. 
126. PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE:  TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 134 (2008). 
127. Form DD 4/1, supra note 117. 
128. For an ethnographic description of this process see generally JOHN W. BORNMANN, 
BECOMING SOLDIERS:  ARMY BASIC TRAINING AND THE NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY (2009). 
129. See infra Part IV.A. 
130. See infra Part IV.B. 
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understood within the military as a form of non-monetary value, in order to 
defend the medal system it was necessary to show that medals were useful, 
that they served to advance a government interest.  Third, this section 
describes how this issue came to a head in the litigation leading up to the 
Supreme Court’s decision United States v. Alvarez, as the parties debated 
whether the medals were incentives or awards, whether they were useful or 
whether they were valuable as such.131 
A. MEDALS IN THE CIVILIAN WORLD 
The value of a medal is transformed as it is taken from the military to 
the civilian world.  Its meaning becomes more diffuse and out of focus as 
the medal is transported to social contexts where fewer people are aware of 
the precise meaning of each medal and do not know how to read the “CV,” 
in Clemmer’s words.132  Yet, if the medals lose some of their specificity 
when presented to an uninitiated audience, their display marks the bearer as 
having crossed over from one domain to the other – and in this sense they 
may become even more vibrant sites of social meaning.  There are some 
routinized formats and methods for translating and deploying medals in 
civilian life:  official formats such as Veterans Day parades; or more 
entrepreneurial and yet still routinized efforts, such as when the decorated 
veteran runs for political office or attends a protest and makes reference to 
his or her status. 
The setting apart of a domain of special status has attracted 
impersonators and fakes.  It is claimed that there are “staggering amounts of 
medals fraud.”133  One newspaper investigation found a third of the persons 
in Who’s Who claiming to have received a medal in fact had not.134  The 
outraged American Legion recounts that these false claimants are 
“individuals of note and accomplishment:  lawyers, physicians, clergymen, 
CEOs, business executives, company presidents, university professors, 
career military officers, teachers, policemen, elected officials, even a 
psychiatrist.”135 
Congress has taken a number of steps to define proper use of medals in 
the civilian world.  In 1904, it patented the Medal of Honor – claiming that 
the “ornamental Design”136 was a new invention.137  In 1923, Congress 
 
131. See infra Part IV.C. 
132. Clemmer, supra note 77, at 2. 
133. Brief for the American Legion, supra note 8, at 16. 
134. Id. (citing John Crewdson, False Courage Claims for Top Military Honors Don’t Hold 
Up, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 2008, at 1). 
135. Id. 
136. U.S. Patent Design No. 37,236 (patented Nov. 22, 1904). 
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criminalized the unauthorized “wearing, manufacture, or sale” of medals.138  
Under current law, it is also a criminal offense to purchase or barter military 
decorations or medals “without authorization.”139  The limitation on 
wearing medals makes it a sumptuary law, albeit in a qualified sense since 
the prohibition has been interpreted to mean “wearing with the intent to 
deceive.”140  Congress has not created a comprehensive database of medal 
holders – so it is difficult to ascertain whether a person is lying or not.141  
Medals can be given as gifts, even if they are not awarded as gifts, because 
the prohibition refers to an “exchange for anything of value.”142  Many of 
the criminal prosecutions policing the boundary of the medal system 
involve a financial dimension.  The cases listed by the Department of 
Justice’s Operation Stolen Valor are mostly of this kind,143 for example, 
where a false Medal of Honor holder receives a larger pension.  While the 
domain is incommensurable in its own terms – that is, one cannot buy 
medals or the status they confer, and they are understood to not be 
comparable to payment in money – the boundaries are inadequately policed.  
If, in the military we are correct to see medals as an effective social 
currency, in the civilian context the matter is far less certain.  Consider, for 
instance, a recent effort to encourage veterans to wear their medals more 
often, which suggests that usage of the currency in the civilian context is 
quite limited.  The Secretary of Veteran’s Affairs urged “[y]ou don’t have 
to put them on only if you’re in a parade. . . .  Wear them when you go play 
golf.  Wear them when you go to the store.  Let America know that you 
took that oath and served.”144 
 
137. Brief for American Legion, supra note 8, at 12 (citing H. REP. NO. 67-1484, at 1 
(1923)).  The design became subject to public use in 1918.  Id. 
138. Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286, 1286. 
139. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
140. United States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 2012).  Barton Beebe, in his 
analysis of how intellectual property law now operates as a sumptuary code, writes that “no free 
market democracy would countenance such restrictions [that control competitive consumption 
directly] on consumer sovereignty,” but here we have an exception.  Barton Beebe, Intellectual 
Property and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 810, 815 (2010) (“We have thus turned to 
intellectual property law because it is the one area of law (outside of prohibitions against fraud) 
that is capable of protecting forms of distinction from imitation and overproduction.”). 
141. See generally OFFICE OF UNDER-SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO THE SENATE 
AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES ON A SEARCHABLE MILITARY VALOR 
DECORATIONS DATABASE (2009). 
142. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a). 
143. See Northwest Crackdown on Fake Veterans in “Operation Stolen Valor,” U.S. 
ATTN’Y’S OFFICE W. DIST. OF WASH. (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press 
/2007/sep/operationstolenvalor html. 
144. Leo Shane III, Dust off Medals for Veterans Day, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 21, 2006), 
http://www military.com/features/0,15240,117426,00 html. 
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The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 was only the most recent step in an 
ongoing effort to constitute distinct domain of value and to police its 
boundaries.  It is especially interesting for our discussion because it does 
not require anything more than a false statement – that is, the offense need 
not have any monetary or other tangible effect.  It asserts the value of the 
intangible.  And yet, it was precisely because of this separation from any 
tangible harm that the law ran aground. 
B. “VALUE BEGETS VALUE” 
The criminalization of false speech raised a conundrum in the litigation 
leading up to Alvarez.  In order to justify the prohibition, the government 
needed to demonstrate it had a compelling, or at least legitimate, interest.  It 
pointed to its own utilitarian need to manage the armed forces and motivate 
soldiers.  In other words, it spoke in the language of modern economics, a 
language of incentives.145  Were medals incentives, perhaps like money?  
Before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the 
government explained its interest in the medals system:  if the value of 
medals was diluted by false claimants, “soldiers may well lose incentive to 
risk their lives to earn such awards.”146  Judge Blackburn found this 
conceptualization “shocking.”147  To suggest “that the battlefield heroism of 
our servicemen and women is motivated in any way . . . by considerations 
of whether a medal may be awarded simply defies . . . comprehension” and 
is “unintentionally insulting to the profound sacrifices of military personnel 
the Stolen Valor Act purports to honor.”148  It was improper to suggest that 
valor and heroism could be viewed as forms of conduct that emerge in 
response to incentives.  Indeed, the court noted, “the qualities of character 
that the medals recognize specifically refute the notion that any such 
 
145. Clemmer cites one popular version, STEVEN D. LEVITT, FREAKONOMICS 13 (2005) 
(“Incentives are the cornerstone of modern life.  And understanding them – or, often, ferreting 
them out – is the key to solving just about any riddle . . . .”).  Clemmer distinguishes between 
internal motivations (the desire to do a good job for its own sake, to provide selfless service) and 
external motivations (a motivation outside the person or the activity).  Clemmer, supra note 77, at 
8-9.  Interestingly, he includes pay, promotion, and awards as “external”.  Id. at 9.  But such an 
external conception is apparently troublesome to many other observers (such as the Legion of 
Valor), as discussed in this section.  See infra pp. 126-27. 
146. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (D. Colo. 2010) (quoting 
Government Response to Amicus Curiae Brief of The Rutherford Institute, United States v. 
Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d (2010) (No.  09-cr-00497-REB)), rev’d, 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 
2012), abrogated by, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) and vacated, 684 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 
684 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2012). 
147. Strandlof, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
148. Id. 
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motivation is at play.”149  The Ninth Circuit, in its decision in Alvarez 
quoted Blackburn’s assessment: 
Even if we were to make the unfounded assumption that our troops 
perform their riskiest missions in the hope of receiving the Medal 
of Honor, there is no evidence – nor any reasonable basis for 
assuming that some people’s false claims to have received the 
medal has a demotivating impact on our men and women in 
uniform.150 
The dilemma the government confronted is intriguing: in order to justify the 
law, it was necessary to point to instrumental policy concerns, but doing so 
threatened to collide with the ideology of medals as marking off a different 
kind of action altogether, one that evoked the importance of symbolic 
meaning and incommensurability. 
The problem of how to explain the government’s interest emerged in a 
variety of ways in the amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court.  
Before turning to the Court’s opinion, this Article will first contrast three of 
these briefs.  The Legion of Valor asserted that medals are a “government-
issued currency of valor.”151  Accordingly, the crime punished under the 
Act is “analogous to counterfeiting.”152  In this conceptualization, it is not 
that medals are tied to money – as in the prosecutions of those who cash in 
on added pension benefits – rather, medals are themselves a “currency.”153  
This series of metaphors, that medals are a government currency, which the 
faker counterfeits, which leads to dilution, allowed for an explanation of the 
harm and hence the government’s interest: 
[E]very real bill is worth a little less for the existence of a fake.  
The existence of fakes causes real bills to be examined with some 
suspicion upon tender.  We have all experienced tendering a bill 
and seeing the cashier mark it with a counterfeit detection pen.  
There is a trace of insult there, however small.154 
Recalling Hart’s emphasis on the two sides of the coin, state and market, 
the Legion of Valor’s conception of the value of medals is distinctly statist, 
because the value comes from the government, and the medals are a 
government issued currency.  It is a “fiat” theory of money and value.155  
 
149. Id. 
150. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
457 (2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 




155. See Hart, supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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As with such theories, it is liable to attack on the grounds that it does not 
see money as simply a token or symbol of something with real value – be it 
gold, or, in this case, an individual’s valor. 
This other side of the coin is expounded upon in an opposing amicus 
brief submitted by a group of criminal defense lawyers: 
The winners of awards such as the Medal of Honor are heroes.  
The honors that they have earned, based on these historic acts, are 
not something that can ever be diluted.  The idea that the 
‘currency,’ . . . can ever be diluted relies on an idea that the honors 
are part of a zero-sum game. . . .  [as] if honor and valor is some 
sort of finite reservoir and that when one person wrongfully 
‘drinks’ out of that reservoir there is less of a supply for those who 
are truly entitled . . . .  The honor offers an intrinsic recognition of 
the great heroism and bravery of the recipients.156 
In this opposing viewpoint, the medals are not currency in a deeper 
sense.157  They are not stores of value in and of themselves but simply 
objects that allow an inner fact or truth about the individual to be visible to 
others.158  It is as though the hero is per se valuable, like gold or a national 
treasure.  The medal does not create that value – it indexes it.  From the 
perspective of this group of criminal defense lawyers, the government does 
not have a legitimate interest. 
So which of these perspectives – that of the Legion of Valor or that of 
the criminal defense lawyers – is correct?  Hart’s point about the two sides 
of the coin is that the coin’s value is at once social and statist.  So, too, with 
the medal.  We simultaneously wish to refer to a truth about the individual, 
and yet seek to use public power to stabilize the system of symbols.  The 
Army regulation discussed earlier touches upon this point in its definition of 
decorations as “mark[s] of honor denoting heroism or meritorious/ 
outstanding service/achievement.”159  It does not purport to constitute value. 
Perhaps the most intriguing effort to explain the government’s interest 
can be found in the amicus brief of The Medal of Honor Foundation.160  
The “purpose behind such awards is not merely to honor brave and heroic 
deeds, but to inspire emulation.”161  They “inspire” soldiers “to engage the 
 
156. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 36, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 
2012 WL 215300 (emphasis in original). 
157. Id. 
158. See id. 
159. AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, Sec. II, at 184 (emphasis added). 
160. Brief for the Medal of Honor Foundation, supra note 13, at 9-10. 
161. Id. at 9. 
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enemy, and to be ready to act cohesively as a unit despite the danger and 
chaos they will encounter.  It inspires most to carry on while others are 
falling around them.”162  In short, the medal system serves to “inspire 
heroic acts without thought of receiving a medal.”163  Evidently, what the 
Medal of Honor Foundation called the Ninth Circuit’s “superficial analysis” 
hit a nerve.164 
Implicit in the court’s reasoning was the notion that the only way to 
understand the need to regulate medals was if they were incentives and this, 
in turn, implied that soldiers were conscious, calculating, benefit-seeking 
actors – this was what was “shocking” to the district court.  The problem 
the Medal of Honor Foundation confronted was subtle:  how to explain the 
instrumental importance of the medal system without degrading the heroic 
and sacrificial action as something triggered by a shallow desire to be given 
an honor or award.  The Legion of Valor sought refuge in the metaphor of 
currency and dilution, but this argument ran into the accusation that it was 
too statist.  The Medal of Honor’s answer was that medals were not only 
about recognition – they transformed soldiers through “emulation,” not 
conscious award-seeking behavior.165  Indeed, they acted “without thought 
of receiving a medal.”166  The amici squared the circle of combining 
instrumental rationales with the excess of sacrifice by asserting, in a 
striking formulation, that “valor begets valor.”167  Valor is not generated by 
desire for money or even desire for recognition.  Nor is it simply a state-
generated product.  It is a self-sustaining cultural value, one that needs 
some state protection, but is not state-created. 
Taken together, the three groups each illustrate a different side of the 
issue:  the value of medals is simultaneously created by the state and by 
action that is not within its control.  The Medal of Honor Foundation’s 
notion that valor begets valor seems to offer the best synthesis since it also 
understands that at issue is a general social value – not simply a state 
product or individual transactions and actions.  But it was not enough, it 
turned out, to sustain the Act. 
By the time the litigation reached the Supreme Court, the government 
made clear that it rejected the view that soldiers “rise to the occasion purely 
 
162. Id. at 10. 
163. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
164. Id. at 26. 
165. Id. at 6. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 33. 
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in hopes of receiving a medal.”168  It also argued that simply because 
awards are not incentives, this need “not detract from the force of the armed 
services’ longstanding view that military awards are a vital means of 
inspiring higher performance and maintaining the morale necessary for 
effective unit performance.”169  In other words, the government urged that 
the awards could be seen as both recognizing valor and as instrumental. 
C. THE ALVAREZ DECISION 
The tensions over how to understand the medals system were in full 
view in the Supreme Court’s opinion overturning the Stolen Valor Act.170  
The case dealt with false statements made by Xavier Alvarez, who, when 
introducing himself as a new member of his local water board in California, 
said:  “I’m a retired marine of 25 years.  I retired in the year 2001.  Back in 
1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.  I got wounded 
many times by the same guy.”171  These were all false statements, made not 
for any financial gain, but simply, Justice Kennedy thought, as “a pathetic 
attempt to gain respect that eluded him.”172 
A majority voted to strike down the law.  But if we isolate the question 
of what kind of value is at issue, the matter is more complicated.  In his 
plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and 
Justices Ginsberg, and Sotomayor, contrasted the law to other prohibitions 
on lying since here there was no “legally cognizable harm.”173  While 
perjury undercuts the judicial system and falsely representing oneself as an 
official undermines government, the Act “targets falsity and nothing 
more.”174  The lack of a link to monetary or some other tangible gain was 
deeply problematic:  “a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech 
was used to gain a material advantage . . . would give government a broad 
censorial power.”175  It is as though the government has been too successful 
in creating an incommensurable domain of value – merely claiming to be a 
member was itself sufficiently attractive, without any other tangible gain.  
In any case, as the offense was not linked to a “material advantage,” the law 
 
168. Brief for the United States 39 n.8, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 
11-210), 2011 WL 6019906. 
169. Id. 
170. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
171. Id. at 2542 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 2548. 
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fell outside the small number of permissible content-based restrictions on 
speech and was thus subject to fatal “exacting scrutiny.”176 
Justice Kennedy recognized the government’s “compelling interests” in 
the medal system since “public recognition of valor and noble 
sacrifice . . . reinforces the pride and national resolve that the military relies 
upon to fulfill its mission.”177  But he was skeptical that there was a “direct 
causal link” between the prohibition and the interest protected.178  It was not 
enough to claim, as did the government, that it was “common sense” that 
liars “‘dilute the value and meaning of military awards.’”179  While a link to 
monetary gain would have assuaged Kennedy’s concerns in his analysis of 
why lying was prohibited, he did not see the medal system as another 
currency, another artificially created symbolic order of scarcity, in which it 
would be axiomatic or “common sense” that an increase in supply dilutes 
relative value.  Instead, Kennedy tended toward a conception of the medals 
as recognizing heroism, not constituting a form of value.  Approvingly 
quoting the Veterans of Foreign Wars amicus brief, Kennedy declared that 
the “general proposition is sound” that “‘there is nothing that charlatans 
such as Xavier Alvarez can do to stain [the Medal winners’] honor.’”180  
That is, the value recognized is inherent in the Act.  Moreover, there was a 
less burdensome way to advance the government’s interest, namely through 
public refutation and shaming of liars, as happened to Alvarez, not criminal 
prosecution.  Rather than seeing a problem of counterfeiting, the problem 
was speech and the solution was “counter-speech.”181  He did, however, 
turn to the favored commercial metaphor in the free speech context:  the 
“best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”182  The public outrage directed at Alvarez’s lies 
“fully vindicated” the government and the genuine medal holder’s 
interests.183  In a flourish, Justice Kennedy noted that the “American people 
do not need the assistance of a government prosecution to express their high 
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needs neither a handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.”184  However, a 
currency very well might. 
Justice Kennedy underscored his desire to move away from 
contemplating intangibles by indicating that the Stolen Valor Act would be 
less vulnerable if linked to “fraud or [undertaking to] secure moneys or 
other valuable consideration.”185  Such a law would return us to more easily 
grasped notions of value as connected to money or some other tangible 
valuation, relieving us of the quandary of just what it means to “steal” 
valor. 
Even though the Act was overturned, there were five Justices who 
accepted the claim that liars presumably harm the medal system.  Justice 
Breyer, concurring (with Justice Kagan), wrote that to “permit those who 
have not earned those honors to claim otherwise dilutes the value of the 
awards,”186 and he did not question what Justice Kennedy called the “causal 
connection” between the prohibition and the government’s interest.187  In 
dissent, Justice Alito (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) framed the 
“intangible” harm at issue through monetary and trademark metaphors.  
Unlike Justice Kennedy, for whom the lies were about “falsity and nothing 
more,” the dissent argued that lies “debase the distinctive honor of military 
awards.”188  Like trademark infringement, “the proliferation of false claims 
about military awards blurs the signal given out by the actual awards by 
making them seem more common than they really are, and this diluting 
effect harms the military by hampering its efforts to foster morale and esprit 
de corps.”189  Justice Kennedy’s solution, more speech in a “market” of 
ideas, would not preserve the value of the medals but simply make matters 
more confused.  In sum, this ‘majority,’ of five concurring and dissenting 
Justices, was willing to assume that the value to be protected was in part 
government created, that it was presumably undercut by others pretending 
to have received that value, and that harm to that form of value need not be 
translated into a monetary or tangible form in order to garner recognition.190 
 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 2547.  This modification has been also proposed by Congressmen Heck (R-Nev).  
H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011) (amending the law to require an intent to “obtain anything 
of value”), available at http:// heck.house.gov/sites/heck house.gov/files/Stolen% 20Valor% 20 
Bill.pdf. 
186. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
187. Id. at 2555-56. 
188. Id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Breyer applied an “intermediate scrutiny” test – 
one in between the usually fatal strict scrutiny that Kennedy applied and the usually permissive 
rational basis test.  Breyer found that the government’s objective could be met in a less 
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VI. PRIVATE CONTRACTORS:  FROM MEDALS TO MONEY 
This final section briefly examines the implications of the 
government’s reliance on private military and security contractors in its 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in light of our discussion of money and 
medals.  How are we to understand those laborers of war, private military 
contractors, who are not eligible for most medals?191 
The privatization and outsourcing of government functions has been 
investigated from a number of perspectives.  We can frame the shift to 
contractors as a policy move away from notions of incommensurability, 
sacrifice, and “primitive” money, and towards the money economy.192  The 
rise of private contractors marks a new relation between the military and a 
global labor market.  Some contractors are highly skilled former soldiers 
and United States citizens.  But the bulk are local and third country 
nationals performing manual jobs, often socially segregated from the 
soldiers they service, and often recruited by middle-men.193  This 
privatization and internationalization is relevant because contractors are 
typically not eligible for medals – even though they have faced higher 
fatalities than soldiers.194  They are not eligible for burial at Arlington 
National Cemetery, and they are generally excluded from the robust 
traditions through which soldier sacrifice is honored and recognized.195  
Thus, the turn to contractors raises questions about the changing place of 
sacrifice in military operations and in our political culture more broadly.196 
Nonetheless, the government has deemed that contractors are eligible 
for public honor as civilians, through awards such as the Defense of 
Freedom Medal.197  This is described on an official website as the “civilian 
 
burdensome manner, and thus the law created a “disproportionate constitutional harm.”  Id. at 
2540. 
191. See AR 600-8-22, supra note 1, 53-54 tbl. 3-4.  The regulation lists which medals may 
be given to U.S. or foreign “civilians.”  Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 672-20, 
INCENTIVE AWARDS, 4 tbl. 2-1 (29 Jan. 1999). 
192. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
193. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & YALE LAW SCH. LOWENSTEIN CLINIC, VICTIMS OF 
COMPLACENCY:  THE ONGOING TRAFFICKING AND ABUSE OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS BY 
U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 19 (2012); see also McCoy, supra note 84, at 676. 
194. Miller, supra note 22; Schooner & Swan, supra note 22, at 13. 
195. 32 C.F.R. § 553.15 (2009); see also Taussig-Rubbo, supra note 29, at 105; see also 
Schooner & Swan, supra note 22, at 13. 
196. Taussig-Rubbo, supra note 29, at 156 (this section draws on that discussion). 
197. Defense of Freedom Medal Unveiled, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 27, 2001), 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3068; see also AR 600-8-22, supra note 
1, at para. 2-8(l) (“The Defense of Freedom Medal, established on 4 October 2001, is the civilian 
equivalent to the Purple Heart awarded to U.S. military personnel”); see also Jim Garamone, 
Intelligence Agency Presents Defense of Freedom Medals, AM. FORCES INFO. SERV. (Oct. 19, 
2001), osd.dtic mil/news/Oct2001/n10192001_200110192 html (“The medal commemorates their 
valor and sacrifice.”). 
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equivalent” of a Purple Heart, as both require the recipient to have been 
injured or killed.198  The deaths may be called “sacrifices” and recognized 
as deaths in the name of the nation,199 but the ceremonies where those 
awards are given are often private events and exclude the media.200  It is not 
only United States citizen contractors who are dying and being recognized 
for their service.  A United States Embassy representative, when awarding 
the Defense of Freedom medal in Fiji, explained to the Fiji Times that “the 
ceremony was to honour the five men who bravely laid down their lives as 
part of an international effort to fight terrorism and create freedom.”201  
Furthermore, some contractor companies have developed their own medals.  
The company formerly known as Blackwater, for instance, gave out its 
Worldwide Defense of Liberty Medal to injured contractors at a private 
event.202  Thus, while the shift to contactors is a shift out of the military’s 
medal system, there are some signs of a new medal system emerging.  
There is an attempt to institutionalize both the sacrifice and a non-monetary 
notion of value of service – but in a manner that protects or excludes the 
public. 
In sum, we can characterize the turn to contractors as a turn away from 
the military’s medal system.  At the same time, there are some indications 
that contractor companies and the government are improvising and 
developing an alternate medal system.  What are the potential implications 
of the shift out of the traditional medal system?  One factor concerns 
 
198. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 197. 
199. T. Christian Miller, War Contractors Receive Defense of Freedom Medal for Injuries, 
But Attract Little Notice, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 18, 2010), http://defensebaseactcomp. 
wordpress.com/2010/02/18/war-contractors-receive-defense-of-freedom-medal-for-injuries-but-
attract-little-notice. 
200. T. Christian Miller, The Battle Scars of a Private War, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007, at 
A1.  The Los Angeles Times described one ceremony in which: 
Executives in dark blue suits shifted uncomfortably as an Army major general in battle 
fatigues awarded posthumous Defense of Freedom medals to the families’ loved ones, 
all contractors killed while working in Iraq.  But this was no public recognition of 
sacrifice. The event was held in secret, with guards to keep out the media.  The Army 
even refused to release the names of those it was honoring.  The nation’s gratitude was 
delivered behind closed doors. 
Id. 
201. Monica Singh, Local War Casualties Get Medals, FIJI TIMES ONLINE (Aug. 15, 2008), 
http://www fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=97870. 
202. The Blackwater name was changed to Xe, and the company is now known as Academi.  
See ACADEMI, http://academi.com/pages/about-us/introduction (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (“Our 
name comes from the Greek akademia, an institution founded by Plato and rooted in higher 
wisdom and skill, producing both thinkers and warriors alike.  ACADEMI is that institution 
today.”); see also Defense Watch, DEFENSE DAILY (June 23, 2008), 2008 WLNR 13239185 
(“Since it wasn’t a public event, the company did not release the names of those honored to the 
media.”  President of Blackwater, Eric Prince “presented ‘The Blackwater Worldwide Defense of 
Liberty Medal’ to each contractor.  ‘I thank each and every one of you for your many sacrifices 
and for your distinguished, selfless service,’ Prince said.”). 
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democratic accountability:  if the awarding of medals serves as a 
governmental and societal reckoning of the costs of war, then, not paying in 
that currency will presumably avoid awareness of that cost.  Another factor 
concerns equity:  while contractors may oftentimes be undertaking the more 
banal and less dramatic work of war, presumably there are instances in 
which, were they soldiers, they would be eligible for an award.  In such an 
instance, the award system can seem arbitrary, based on ex ante status and 
not on individual conduct.  This restates the question of the value of medals 
already discussed:  do they create value or do they simply recognize what is 
already there?  The question of equity also provokes a different reaction:  if 
it is a valid assumption that the contractor is motivated primarily by money, 
not sacrifice and service, it may be entirely appropriate to exclude them 
from these other forms of compensation that are offered to the soldier. 
The rise of the private contractor puts the Stolen Valor Act in a 
different light.  We have a class of persons who may have some plausible 
claim to the recognition bestowed by medals – but who are per se excluded 
from the military medals system in general.  Through a policy of not 
recognizing contractors’ eligibility for most medals, is their “valor” being 
stolen as well?  If the concern with the false claimant is that they dilute the 
meaning of medals, here the concern is that the value may be artificially 
inflated by excluding the large number of third-world workers who may 
also act heroically.  And how do the efforts to create ersatz medals, such as 
Blackwater’s, compare to the conduct the Stolen Valor Act seeks to punish?  
Are these an effort to steal valor as well; or are they appropriate private-
sector solutions to address an inequitable defect in public policy? 
And yet there seem to be great dangers in allowing contractors to 
receive both money and the same medals and public honor awarded within 
the military.  Given our analysis of the important role of the medals within 
the military, opening up the Pyramid of Honor to contractors would seem to 
risk confounding and undermining the medal currency and its place within 
the military world.  To put the concern bluntly, while the government 
explicitly bans the imposter, we may wonder whether it has itself created a 
class of imposters through its outsourcing policy; or, more sympathetically 
to the contractors, whether Congress has improperly excluded a class of 
labor from proper recognition. 
The most obvious link between money and medals is one not 
mentioned yet:  that privatization or outsourcing saves money.  While this is 
an oft-repeated claim, what is striking about the military outsourcing over 
the past decade is the lack of effort expended in collecting even the most 
rudimentary figures that would enable officials to test the claim of lower 
          
318 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:283 
cost, such as the number of contractors engaged or the total cost.203  Due to 
a particularity of the military budgeting process, contractors are often hired 
through contingency funds and thus are often perceived, by senior officials 
in the military, as “free.”204  But what is incontrovertible is that 
privatization has proved efficient in terms of moving much military labor 
out of the heavily sacramental category of soldier – eligible for medals, for 
recognition for national sacrifice, and so forth – and into the less august 
category of contractor.  To pay in money is to assert that the debt can be 
settled, and thus permits the government to avoid the complexities of the 
medals as a social currency. 
To see the medal as the socially meaningful token that marks social 
interconnectedness and money as impersonal and lacking in social meaning 
would be, however, to forget Hart’s image of the two sides of the coin.  The 
shift to contractors and paying in money should not be seen as a shift to the 
“market” in any simple sense.  Both money and medals are, in part, statist 
undertakings.  They differ, however, in how they display their sociability.  
Money presents itself as abstract and impersonal, even while created by the 
sovereign. Medals, especially those for valor and suffering, do not claim 
that the relation between the giver and recipient is thereby concluded. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined multiple intersections between, and 
definitions of, medals and money.  In the discussion of George 
Washington’s Purple Heart, it seemed that giving medals was a way to 
compensate for not giving money.  Drawing on Radin and a notion of 
incommensurability, medals articulated an understanding that some types of 
action could not be paid for in money.  But the Article did not simply 
 
203. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., AT WHAT COST?  
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, INTERIM REPORT16-17 (2009). 
204. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, supra note 20, at 22.  The Commission 
report recounts that: 
For many senior officials, contractors appear to be a “free” source of labor with no 
direct impact on their budgets.  Funded out of what they perceive to be unconstrained 
overseas contingency-operation budgets, many senior officials pay scant attention to 
articulating specific support requirements, negotiating contract terms, and managing 
contractor performance.  A general officer who briefed the Commission during its visit 
to Kuwait in February 2010 said that if there is no budget restriction and all contract-
support requirements are met, then commanders have no incentive to consider costs.  
Despite the critical nature of contingency acquisition, this relatively lax approach 
stands in stark contrast to the way DoD manages its military personnel.  Although 
some improvements have been made, agency officials still have little incentive to 
consider costs and therefore may choose to minimize performance risk by consuming 
and paying more than is reasonable or necessary. 
Id. 
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confound the divide between medals and money by asking whether medals 
could be seen as money, or whether they were truly different kinds of value. 
It also asked whether medals could be seen as a social currency as 
described by anthropologists, a form of money often worn as adornment.  
While appealing, this asserted parallel between the medal system and a 
social currency has a number of caveats in that the medal system does not 
operate through individuals’ local knowledge of credit distributions and is 
created (or recognized) by the state.  The value of social currencies was, as 
Graeber contended, typically local.205  And it emerged in contexts where 
there is no state.  In other words, it is not surprising that a social currency, 
such as the medal system in a mass society, will encounter the problem of 
fraud and counterfeiting, since the value does not emerge out of local and 
individually tracked credit relations.  Indeed, what our examination has 
encountered again and again was that the medal is a fascinating 
combination of “primitive” money and impersonal, abstract, and state-
created value.  It is, we might say, itself a fake kind of social currency – 
fake because it is created by a centralized authority.  And yet it is not only a 
state creation for it purports to recognize valor, heroism and sacrifice, and 
in this dimension is genuinely a social currency that allows a persons’ value 
to be visible through adornment. 
In Graeber’s story, states, armies and abstract, decontextualized forms 
of money emerged together.  Thus, to find a social currency occupying a 
central place in the military is noteworthy.  The truly fascinating issue is the 
interdependence between the state’s two currencies: its actual money and its 
medal system.  The key question is whether the state needs its medal 
currency.  We can depict our current order as one composed of both a 
universal money form that has penetrated more social orders than ever 
before with a single measure and store of value, but which also relies on a 
strange form of social currency. 
The issue of what sort of value the state could create, and what steps it 
could take to protect that value, were at the heart of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alvarez.  Justice Kennedy did not see the value of the social 
status that the medal system created as one presumptively harmed by false 
claims, and he indicated that linking the offense to some material loss could 
preserve the law.  A loss of money, even though simply another state 
symbol, was tangible.  A loss in the valor system consisting of dilution was 
intangible.  Justice Kennedy articulated a non-statist, intrinsic, 
understanding of the value of medals.  By this view, the valor of the true 
hero cannot be stained by the false claimant.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
 
205. See GRAEBER, supra note 45, at 213. 
          
320 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:283 
removes one tool for policing the boundaries of military honor; and yet, the 
rest of the statute restricting the manufacture, wearing, and sale of medals 
remains in force, as does the exclusion of contractors from the medal 
system. 
This Article began by noting the repeated invocation, in the context of 
the debate around the Stolen Valor Act, of the story of George Washington 
and the creation of the Purple Heart.  Rather than situating ourselves as 
within that tradition, perhaps our order is better seen as an inversion of 
Washington’s story.  Washington “paid” in valor rather than money because 
the Congress was out of money.  Now, the United States increasingly pays 
in money rather than valor.  This may be a concern if the medal currency 
serves a valuable role in enhancing the accountability of the government 
and military to the population at large by requiring officials to acknowledge 
publicly the human impact of war-making.  On the other hand, this 
recognition could also serve to disempower the public if it positions them as 
grateful recipients of the soldier’s beneficence.  If paying in medals may 
mean that the pay offered the soldier was not enough – that pay is never 
enough – then the medal signifies an ongoing obligation.  This may be 
appropriate, but it is also troubling.  That, surely, is an attraction of the 
contractor – that accounts can be settled. 
Is the end point, then, a rather familiar story: that yet another domain of 
life succumbs to the ethos of the market, and commensurability as 
measured in money?  Things are probably not so simple, and such a 
conclusion would ignore the continued importance of the medal system in 
the military.  More plausibly, the lesson to take from our examination of the 
multitude of conceptions of value is that our obligations to one another are 
not contained in one form of currency and credit, be it money or medals. 
